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Abstract  
This study examines the extent to which board of directors are providing ‘governance oversight’ of 
their organization’s IT activities and whether their efforts are making any difference in terms of 
organizational performance. Building on contingency theory we theorize that the magnitude of IT 
oversight exercised by boards depends on an organization‘s particular IT situation and especially its 
need for (1) fast and reliable IT, and (2) new innovative IT. However, we also posit that the 
contingency approach may be suboptimal because it focuses only on current IT needs, and may ignore 
other potential competitive and defensive uses of IT. These future-looking considerations are in line 
with the resource-based view of the firm according to which IT is a key resource which, when utilized 
efficiently and effectively, can create a competitive advantage. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the 
magnitude of board-level IT oversight positively affects firm performance regardless of existing IT 
needs, Using structural equation modelling analysis applied to data collected from a sample of 146 
directors, representing 146 Canadian firms we found support for all our hypotheses.  Implications for 
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To what extent are boards of directors currently providing ‘governance oversight’ of their 
organization’s IT activities and, if so, is it making any difference in terms of performance? Not so long 
ago, it was generally reported  that boards of directors were reluctant to deal with IT issues; were 
passive receivers of IT information; and expressed little interest in their organization’s return on its IT 
investments (Huff et al., 2004; 2005).  This ‘IT indifference’ on the part of boards was happening 
despite the fact that some firms (principally in the financial services sector) were spending half their 
capital budgets on IT (Ellis et al., 2000; Huff et al., 2005). It has also proven to be a financially costly 
attitude (Anthony et al., 2006; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005).   
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), corporate boards have been increasingly 
challenged to provide more and better oversight – or supervision - of their organizations’ IT functions 
in order to reduce the risks facing their enterprises, but especially, the loss or embarrassment occurring 
from fraud, error or non-compliance (Bowen et al., 2007; Klamm and Watson, 2009; Nolan and 
McFarlan, 2005; Weill, 2004; Weill and Ross, 2004). In Canada, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (CSA) issued National Instrument 52-109 (“Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ 
Annual and Interim Fillings”), which is part of the CSA’s Investor Confidence Rules. It is fairly 
similar to the rules of SOX’s Section 404 – the latter of which requires the management of publicly 
listed companies to evaluate the effectiveness of their organization’s internal controls over financial 
reporting (including IT) and provide disclosure about their conclusions.  Such regulations further push 
boards of directors to plan, assess and monitor the ability of their IT systems to comply with 
regulations. 
 
In response, the boards of some organizations (e.g. FedEx, Hewlett-Packard, Home Depot, American 
Airlines, Wal-Mart) have created a board-level IT governance committee (or mandated another board 
committee e.g., audit and finance) with the responsibility to supervise and appraise IT operations. 
Others have approved the creation of a Chief Information Officer position (to increase operational 
oversight of IT) and then regularly request his/her attendance at board meetings. However, it is 
generally recognized today that the principle activity which boards need to perform in discharging 
their specific IT supervisory responsibilities is to ask pertinent, probing and thought-provoking 
questions of management (CICA, 2004; ISO, 2008; IT Governance Institute, 2003).   
 
Realizing the importance of this issue, several recent papers have discussed the concept of IT 
governance(2) – or ITG - its importance, and suggest a number of IT governance frameworks (e.g., 
Nolan and McFarlan, 2005; Raghupathi, 2007; Weill and Ross, 2004). However, beyond some 
anecdotal commentaries, there is no generally accepted overarching framework for ITG (Raghupathi, 
2007). Little empirical research exists on the board’s actual involvement in IT governance (i.e., did 
companies actually shift IT emphasis from the “C-Level” to the boardroom?”) and, most importantly, 
whether their efforts are even worthwhile. 
 
This paper presents findings related to our examination of the IT governance role that Canadian board 
members from 146 organizations provide through the IT issues they discuss in the boardroom. We 
used the set of 27 board focused IT governance questions developed by the Canadian Institute of 
                                            
2 The IT Governance Institute (2003) states that “IT governance is the responsibility of the board of 
directors and executive management. It is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the 
leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains 




Chartered Accountants (CICA, 2004) and inquired about the extent to which the questions were 
actually asked. We were also interested in determining whether the ITG questions asked might depend 
on a firm’s particular IT needs and, additionally, whether they influenced performance. This study 
therefore represents one of the first investigations into the extant involvement of boards of directors in 
information technology governance. It is also one of the few to compare actual board ITG practice 
within the context of a prescribed set of recommended IT governance questions. 
 
The specific research questions we asked of our sample were as follows: 
 
1. What is the magnitude of ITG oversight provided by a board of directors through the ITG 
questions they ask? More specifically, to what extent have boards of directors asked the 27 
ITG questions recommended by the CICA?  
2. Is the magnitude of ITG questions asked by a board “contingent” on the way their 
organization uses IT?  
3. Does the magnitude of a board’s ITG questions have merit i.e. influence performance? 
Finding answers to the first two questions will help boards determine to what extent the 27 questions 
recommended by the CICA are being used. Moreover, it will help inform boards regarding the way 
others are dispensing their IT governance oversight responsibilities and help them assess whether they 
are ahead of the pack, behind the pack, or running with the majority. The third question is particularly 
important because many directors lack the knowledge to discuss IT issues (Huff et al., 2004; Nolan 
and McFarlan, 2005) and consequently are afraid ‘to raise IT issues at meetings for fear of 
embarrassing themselves in front of their peers.’ (Huff et al., 2004, p. 4). Furthermore, busy boards of 
directors want to channel their efforts in areas where they perceive a payoff to the organization and 
themselves. Knowing that the questions can make a difference in terms of an organization’s 
performance, therefore, can give directors the courage or incentive they need to speak up and allocate 
board time to discuss IT matters. It will give much needed knowledge into some of the board oversight 
practices of successful enterprises. Additionally, it will both validate the future use of the questions 
and prove that the expansion of IT governance from the executive team to include the board of 
directors is not just hype.  
2 THEORY 
This study builds primarily on Contingency Theory (Fiedler, 1964) and the Resource Based View of 
the firm (Hart, 1995; Schroeder et al., 2002). Contingency theory suggests that there is no optimal 
configuration, leadership and control structure that fits all companies and that choosing the optimal 
configuration, leadership or control structure (1) depends on the environment of the company, and (2) 
influences the company’s performance (Fiedler, 1964; Schoonhoven, 1981; Zeithaml et al., 1988). 
While this theory has been used in management research (e.g.,Hollenbeck et al., 2002; Otley, 1980) 
and information system research (e.g., Austin and Devin, 2009; Lee et al., 2004), it has not yet been 
applied to IT governance. In this study, we posit that Contingency Theory applies and that, depending 
on a firm’s particular current IT circumstances or needs, a board of directors will exercise varying 
levels of oversight over their firms’ current IT activities. 
However, the Resource Based View of the firm argues that it is the efficient and effective use of firm 
resources, including IT, that leads to a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 2001; Peteraf, 
1993). The proper deployment of IT resources, therefore, is imperative because IT resources have 
attributes (e.g., value, rarity) that are instrumental to advantage creation and also prevent imitation - 
thereby sustaining the advantage created (Wade and Hulland, 2004). Accordingly, in this study we 
also posit that high levels of  ITG oversight by boards of directors (regardless of a firm’s current IT 
circumstances) is the effective way of supervising management’s use of IT resources, and as such, it 




2.1 Drivers of IT Governance by the Board 
Several conceptual papers suggest that boards should employ a contingency plan when it comes to the 
way they exercise their ITG. After all, not all firms are alike, and some boards, at least in theory, 
should put more emphasis on IT issues than others. For example, it would make sense that eBay.com 
emphasize IT in the boardroom to a greater extent than, say, a knitting factory.  Why? It has to do with 
the way organizations use their IT and their needs for different systems.  This notion is aligned with 
contingency theory (Fiedler, 1964) according to which there is no one optimal way to organize, lead 
and control, and the different ways to do this are not equally effective (Schoonhoven, 1981; Zeithaml 
et al., 1988). IT therefore requires organizations to assess their particular situations and find their 
optimal magnitudes of ITG oversight. 
This proposition was confirmed in one small study which compared board ITG practices between 
eight firms from the financial services sector and nine from the primary resources sector (Huff et al., 
2004). The researchers expected – and found - that the boards of financial services firms exercised 
greater IT oversight due to the information intensity of their industry. In contrast, the boards of the 
primary resources companies “seldom, if ever, discuss IT, even though many of them have large IS 
departments and significant IT capital investments” (Huff et al., 2004, p.2). They further explained 
that for these latter firms “if IT collapsed, the inconvenience might be great, but basic operations (e.g., 
digging coal out of the ground) would continue” (Huff et al., 2004, p.2). 
Recently, some researchers (6) have advanced the notion that companies can be categorized into four 
‘IT usage modes’, based on two criteria: (1) their need for new, cutting-edge technologies to gain 
competitive advantage (‘high need/offensive use’ versus ‘low need/defensive use’), and (2) their need 
for fast and reliable information technologies (high need versus low need). The four resultant IT usage 
modes (i.e. factory, strategic, support and turnaround) are depicted in Figure 1 as well as the 14 
indicators for determining a firm’s mode classification. (Note: Some of the individual indicators are 
used to help classify more than one mode.) 
Companies in the ‘turnaround mode’ do not need fast, reliable IT systems and so there is less concern 
regarding a major system failure. Such companies, though, will still attempt to use innovative, less 
tested technologies ‘offensively’ to help them implement major transformations, reduce costs and 
generally close gaps with competitors. In contrast, companies in the strategic mode heavily rely upon 
both expensive state-of-the-art IT for producing significant strategic gains (e.g., tapping into new 
markets) and quick, highly reliable systems (which typically require stronger IT security, stability and 
backup than those in the turnaround mode). When companies do not need such revolutionary 
technologies to thrive strategically but nevertheless require rapid response and reliable IT to carry out 
major operations (e.g. an automated auto assembly line) their IT usage is more ‘defensive’ in nature 
and they are categorized as “factory mode”. 
Finally, ‘support mode’ companies are those in which both the need for IT response swiftness and 
reliability is low and there is a low need for new state-of-the-art technologies to stay in business (i.e. 




 Figure 1: The Four IT Usage Modes and theirMode Classification  Indicators (adapted from Nolan 
and McFarlan, 2005) 
 
It is hypothesized that the differences in both “the need for new IT” and “the need for reliable IT” 
should also translate into different board ITG mindsets and, accordingly, the magnitude of oversight 
they will provide on IT issues (6). In other words, both the nature and quantity of ITG questions raised 
by directors will vary with – or be contingent upon – an organization’s relative need for new and/or 
reliable IT. For example, it would be logical to expect that the greater the need either for innovative 
(and potentially strategic) IT or for fast and reliable systems, the greater the magnitude of ITG 
oversight that would be exercised by a board. The opposite would be true for those boards 
representing firms with a low need for either strategic or reliable systems – or both. In line with the  
premises of contingency theory (Fiedler, 1964), the conceptual frameworks mentioned above (e.g., 
Nolan and McFarlan, 2005), and evidence from ITG practice (Huff et al., 2004) we suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
H1a: The greater an organization’s need for new IT (i.e., using IT ‘offensively’), the greater the 
magnitude of ITG oversight provided by the board of directors. 
H1b: The greater an organization’s need for fast and reliable IT, the greater the magnitude of ITG 
oversight provided by the board of directors. 
2.2 Outcomes of Board IT Governance 
Several publications have provided prescriptive guidelines regarding the number and type of ITG 
questions board member should raise to assess their current IT situation and to provide effective ITG 
oversight (CICA, 2004; ISO, 2008; IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). The 
questions can be classified into four categories: (1) efficient management and use of IT, (2) risk 
assessment and mitigation, (3) strategic use of new IT, and (4) internal control and auditing of IT. 
Using the categories mentioned above, it is easy to understand why more extensive board IT 
governance should lead to stronger organizational performance i.e., boards of directors that take their 
ITG oversight responsibilities seriously and, in so doing, cast a wide net around IT issues will steer 
their organizations toward more efficient and effective use of IT resources. They will be better able to 
determine if their management is deploying their organization’s IT both efficiently and more 
effectively relative to the competition. They will be able to assess whether management is regularly 
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evaluating the use of new IT (or new uses of existing IT) rather than simply accepting the existing IT 
status quo. They will also be in a better position to assess the risk-reward tradeoffs on any major IT 
issue. Notwithstanding the contingency theory argument that IT governance questions should vary 
with an organization’s IT needs, it seems equally reasonable to hypothesize that the more ITG 
oversight a board provides through the questions they ask, the higher a firm’s financial performance – 
especially in relation to industry peers.  
This notion is in line with the ‘resource based view of the firm’ but, here focusing specifically IT 
resources. This theory argues that the ultimate expected outcome of efficient and effective utilization 
and management of resources is competitive advantage and superior performance (Hart, 1995). 
Information technologies are a key resource that can help firms, when properly manged, to form and 
sustain superior performance (Kearns and Lederer, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004; Wade and 
Gravill, 2003). To capture performance this study focuses on a ‘director’s satisfaction with firm 
performance’, his or her beliefs regarding ‘the level of satisfaction of the board of directors as a whole 
with firm performance’, and the ‘relative performance standing of the firm within its industry’. As 
opposed to hard growth figures and financial ratios, these are measures that are easy to elicit from 
directors, and that capture an assessment of the ‘relative performance’ of the company within its peer 
group. We therefore hypothesize: 
H2a-c: The greater the magnitude of ITG oversight provided by a board of directors, the greater a 
firm’s performance as captured by (a) the board’s satisfaction with the organization’s performance (b) 
the responding director’s satisfaction with the organization’s performance, and (c) the firm’s relative 
standing within its industry. 
3 THE FIELD STUDY 
To test the relationships among (a) the way various organizations use IT, (b) the corresponding ITG 
oversight questions posed by their boards of directors, and (c) the firms’ associated relative financial 
performance, a paper-based survey was administered to 215 board members who attended a corporate 
director governance training program in Canada. Out of them, 146 board members representing 146 
Canadian firms completed the survey (response rate of about 68%).  
Data collected on each organization included its sales (in Millions of CAD $), number of employees, 
and the type of orientation (i.e. for-profit or not-for-profit). These variables were used as controls in 
the proposed model. As measures of performance, respondents were asked to indicate: 
• their board’s and their own satisfaction with their organization’s current financial performance, 
using a ten point Likert scale (1 = Not at all satisfied; 10 = Extremely satisfied); and 
• the “relative performance standing” of the organization in its particular industry, again using a ten 
point Likert scale (1 = Significantly below; 10 = Significantly above); 
To assess each organization’s need (i.e., “high” versus “low”) for new and fast/reliable IT, respondents 
were queried - using a seven point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) - on their 
level of agreement with the 14 questions depicted in Figure 1(Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). For each 
respondent, the ‘average level of agreement’ reported for the questions indicating ‘high need for new 
IT’ (i.e., the questions in the right column in Figure 1) was calculated and compared with the average 
level of agreement reported for the questions indicating ‘low need for IT’ (i.e., the questions in the left 
column of Figure 1). Using this comparison, firms were classified (based on the highest column score) 
as having either a low or high need for new IT. A binary variable corresponding with this 
classification was created (i.e., Low need for new IT = 0; High need for new IT = 1). A similar 
comparison between the ‘average level of agreement’ calculated for the questions in the top and 
bottom rows of Figure 1 was used for generating a dummy variable to capture each company’s need 
for fast, reliable IT (i.e., Low need = 0; High need = 1). The frequencies of these variables in the 
sample are presented in Table 1. 
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Finally, to assess the magnitude of their IT governance oversight, respondents were asked to indicate 
whether their boards of directors raised a list of 27 ITG questions that were recommended by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) to help corporate directors with their ITG duties 
(CICA, 2004). The reported total of the ITG questions raised was used as a proxy for the degree of 
ITG oversight provided by each board. It is acknowledged that this measure captures only ITG 
oversight breadth and not depth (e.g., the ‘amount of time’ or ‘number of meetings’ devoted to IT 
issues in the boardroom), but the latter is difficult to quantify. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the breadth of ITG oversight is at least somewhat correlated with the length of any ITG 
discussion. 
 
Using these data, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics regarding the participating organizations:  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Organizations 
4 FINDINGS 
In answer to the first research question, the median number of questions raised by the boards in the 
sample was 17 (or 63% of the total questions). Only one firm (representing 0.7% of the sample) was 
reported as raising all 27 IT-issues in the boardroom; and no ITG questions were asked in 10 (6.8%) of 
the sample firms. The mean, median and mode number of questions asked were 11.7, 11.0, and 9.0 
respectively. It is therefore concluded that the magnitude of ITG oversight provided by the boards in 
our sample was fairly prevalent and moderately exercised, but also to a varying extent. 
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To answer the second and third research questions, a model of IT governance (based on the ITG 
‘drivers’ and ‘outcomes’ previously discussed) was tested with the structural equation modelling 
facilities of AMOS 18. Initially, the model included three common corporate governance control 
variables, namely sales ($M), number of employees (EMPEE), and whether the organization is for-
profit or not-for-profit was estimated (TYPE). While the data fit the model well (χ2(6) = 1.76 (non 
significant, p<0.94), CFI=1.0, RMSEA=0.00 with p-close = 0.98, and SRMR = 0.01)3, the EMPEE 
and TYPE variables did not significantly affect the model and were removed from further analyses. 
Sales significantly influenced the magnitude of ITG oversight and it was therefore retained. The final 
model, the implied standardized path coefficients, their levels of significance, and the variables’ 
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC = the variation in a variable that is explained by its predictors) 
are depicted in Figure 2.  The data fit this model well (χ2(9) = 2.58 (non significant, p<0.98), CFI=1.0, 
RMSEA=0.00 with p-close = 0.99, and SRMR = 0.02 ) and together provided support to the theory we 
put forth.  
 
 
Figure 2: A model of drivers  and outcomes of ITG oversight by the board of directors 
This model implies, in line with our expectations, that directors employ a contingency approach when 
dispensing ITG oversight for their particular organizations. Specifically, the more that 
companies need newer IT (presumably for strategically offensive manoeuvring in their competitive 
marketplace) and/or need quick, reliable IT to manage their operations, the greater the magnitude of 
ITG oversight (i.e. number of ITG questions) provided by directors in their board meetings. Boards of 
companies with higher sales also raise more IT questions possibly because they have more at stake 
                                            
3 These are fit indices that assess the ability of the model to reproduce the covariance structure implied by the data. The χ2 
statistics is expected to be non significant. CFI = Comparative Fit Index (values over 0.95 are considered adequate). RMSEA 
= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (values below 0.05 are adequate; p-values for this statistic of over 0.05 indicate 
that the model is likely to have RMSEA below 0.05 and that the data therefore fits the model well). SRMR = Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (values below 0.08  are considered adequate) 
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i.e., they face higher losses if their organization’s IT systems fail and they have potentially higher 
revenues if IT is efficiently used. Together these three variables explain 19% of the variation in the 
magnitude of ITG oversight. The remaining 81% of the variation in the magnitude of ITG oversight 
may be explained by other variables, such as the board’s level of comfort with IT issues. Such new 
predictors should be explored in future studies.  
The magnitude of ITG oversight by the board also increased all three of our relative performance 
measures. This would indicate that ITG oversight by the board is valuable and appears to translate into 
relatively strong financial performance.  The fact that, depending on the measure, 6% to 9% of the 
variation in firm performance was explained by the magnitude of board level ITG oversight is 
impressive because there are so many other variables (e.g., CEO competency, market forces, etc.) that 
can influence it. We therefore concluded that broad, strong oversight of a firm’s IT by its board of 
directors is a worthwhile activity and that having board members ask more ITG questions (rather than 
less) appears to be rewarded with higher firm performance.  
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A firm’s increasing reliance on newer, faster and more reliable IT has increased the potential gains 
(and losses) associated with IT, and consequently, it has pushed boards of directors to often step out of 
their comfort zone and start dealing with IT issues. Without such oversight, board may fail to 
adequately serve the interests of their corporations in general and their shareholders in particular. Our 
findings demonstrate that, indeed, the vast majority of Canadian boards represented in our sample 
routinely raised almost two thirds of the 27 ITG questions recommended by the CICA. But, what 
about those boards that did not? One reason might be because many board members are simply not 
aware of the relevant IT questions they should ask. Another might be that often times directors simply 
feel uncomfortable (or inadequate) discussing the topic (Huff et al., 2004). ITG training in director 
schools and in Executive MBA programs, therefore, could correct this by emphasizing the IT issues to 
be “probed” by a board and by stressing the importance of ITG oversight as part of a director’s 
fiduciary duty. Accounting and corporate governance bodies could further the IT issues to be 
discussed by the board by updating, for example, the CICA guidelines (CICA, 2004). 
Our findings also demonstrate that, in line with the conventional wisdom, common prescriptive 
guidelines (e.g., Nolan and McFarlan, 2005), and contingency theory (Fiedler, 1964), boards of 
directors appear to employ a contingency approach when discussing their organization’s IT. 
Depending on their organizations’ need for innovative and/or reliable IT, boards adjust their IT 
governance oversight accordingly. Companies with lower needs along these two dimensions have 
boards of directors who tend to raise, on average, less IT questions than those companies with higher 
needs. But is this practice advantageous? Does it lead to the optimal structure and control mechanism 
prescribed by contingency theory? 
What is interesting in this particular study is the right side of our ITG model in Figure 2. While 
directors, for the most part, are encouraged to behave based on prescribed contingency guidelines (i.e., 
the left side of the model), our findings demonstrate that regardless of the circumstances, the more IT 
questions a board raises, the better their organizations perform. This supports the resource based view 
of the firm and the strategic importance of IT resources (Wade and Hulland, 2004). Our findings, 
therefore, suggest that a contingency approach to IT governance, while a recommended theoretical 
practice, is not necessarily an optimal one. Accordingly, better boards systematically inquire into as 
many of the ITG oversight questions prescribed by the CICA (CICA, 2004) as possible because, in so 
doing, they help contribute to the creation and sustainability of competitive advantage through IT 
(Peteraf, 1993; Ray et al., 2004). 
So, what might explain these findings? As we hypothesized earlier, casting a wider net of ITG 
oversight can help companies mitigate IT risks, use IT more efficiently, and generate greater strategic 
gains with IT, regardless of their IT situations. These elements also translate into higher relative 
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financial performance. Thus, even companies that have a low need for state-of-the-art and/or reliable 
IT can benefit from high levels of ITG oversight because it can help them (a) see the possibilities and 
advantages from using newer, faster, and more reliable IT, (b) become more competitively aggressive 
and (c) harvest a larger share of sales in their respective industries (e.g., even a knitting factory can 
benefit from broader ITG oversight). While some have argued that the strategic importance of IT has 
diminished, and that perhaps IT does not even matter anymore (Carr, 2003), this study proves 
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